RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 7

Number 4

Article 7

September 1996

Competing Conceptions of Risk
Paul B. Thompson
Wesley Dean

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Philosophy Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Repository Citation
Paul B. Thompson & Wesley Dean, Competing Conceptions of Risk , 7 RISK 361 (1996).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health,
Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository.
For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.

Competing Conceptions of Risk
Paul B. Thompson & Wesley Dean*

Introduction

Risk issues are unarguably contentious. People evaluate risks in
incompatible ways and propose conflicting proposals for mitigating or
litigating risk issues. The sources of contention are multiple. Sometimes
people differ because they have different information; sometimes they
differ because they have incompatible interests. This paper addresses
one of the more philosophical and systemic bases for differing opinions
and approaches: The possibility that people have fundamentally or
substantially different conceptions of risk. The philosophical basis for
contention over risk is most evident in the scholarly and scientific
literature. Experts who study risk or risk issues are more likely to
develop well-defined, internally consistent conceptions of risk than
members of the lay public. If distinct philosophical and linguistic
presumptions underlie competing conceptions of risk, it should be
possible to formulate the contentiousness over alternatives in terms of a
principled philosophical debate, with implications for risk analysis, risk
evaluation and risk communication.
Concepts, Conceptions and Definitions
Do experts who differ on risk issues have different concepts of risk,
as Judith Bradbury claims, 1 or do they simply employ different
definitions? It depends. The terms "concept," and "definition," are
themselves often used in overlapping ways. First, we stipulate how each
term will be applied to risk debates in the following analysis, then
develop a usage for the term "conception." We will assume that the
*
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concept of risk is shared by all speakers of English, and indeed by
speakers of any language for which there is a direct cognate. The
concept of risk is fixed by broad parameters that allow people to parse
and interpret sentences in which the word "risk" occurs, and that link
the verb and noun forms of the word to its adjectival (risky) and
adverbial (riskily) forms. Standard lexical or dictionary definitions
attempt to articulate the meaning of a concept by paraphrasing
common usage in roughly equivalent terms. In scientific, technical or
scholarly contexts, however, it is often necessary to stipulate a more
precise meaning. Stipulative definitions establish a narrower set of
equivalent terms or operational procedures for determining when a
term applies, and indicate how it is connected to other theoretical
terminology. A stipulative definition of risk specifies formulae, data,
quantitative relationships and other terms that determine procedures
for using the term "risk" in a specific context. Such a definition specifies
substitution criteria that permit the replacement of references to risk
with definitional equivalents.
Conceptually ambiguous words and failure to stipulate definitions
can lead to simple miscommunication or disputes about the meaning of
terminology, but such disputes do not usually evidence deeper
philosophical differences. The word "revolting" can be used to express
two distinct concepts, leading to ambiguous sentences such as "The
peasants are revolting." One who interprets the sentence as a statement
about the peasant's political activism may misconnect with another who
interprets it as a statement about peasant demeanor and comportment.
This is a case where different concepts are being applied. Two social
scientists who study peasant revolution may also misconnect over this
sentence, if one defines "revolt" to mean armed resistance for example,
while the other does not. Here there are two definitions for a single
concept, and redress of the miscommunication consists simply in
stipulating the definition for terminology more carefully.
Of course it may turn out that the difference of opinion between
these two social scientists cuts deeper. One may think that "revolt"
should be defined in terms of armed resistance, while the other does
not, and these reasons may connect up with broad philosophical
commitments to methods of social inquiry. In such cases, clarifying
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definitional differences does not end the disagreement; it is in fact only
the first salvo in an extended philosophical debate. John Rawls
distinguished a similar kind of philosophical dispute over the meaning
of "justice" from mere definitional disputes and conceptual confusions
by characterizing it as a debate between competing conceptions of
justice. Opponents in this debate share a common concept of justice; it
is not that one group uses the word "justice" to mean accurate criminal
verdicts, for example, while the other uses it to evaluate the basic
structure of society. Rawls was concerned with social justice and found
that opponents had profoundly different conceptions of social justice.
Philosophical disagreements reflecting different conceptions of justice
are not simply definitional disputes, since many who shared the same
conception of justice would apply different definitions in their work,
and noting definitional differences between those who had different
2
conceptions solved nothing.
Rawls hoped that distinguishing concept from conception would
allow those with different conceptions of justice to agree on those
matters where their conceptions were not in conflict. Our purposes are
less ambitious. The claim that there are competing conceptions of risk
means first that when experts analyze or study risk, they are appealing
to a general concept that unifies all uses of the word according to the
broadest patterns of language. It also means that the concept of risk can
be interpreted in at least two distinct ways, and that distinct
interpretations form the basis for philosophically incompatible
statements about risk. Disputes about competing conceptions of risk
take the form of principled and reasoned disputes, as opposed to simple
misunderstandings. The claim that there are competing conceptions of
risk implies that the concept of risk is like contested concepts such as
"causality," "reality," "justice" and "truth" in that competing
interpretations reflect philosophical differences that are long-standing
and systematically linked. Such differences will not be settled merely
by stipulating definitions for the disputed terms. Generally speaking,
stipulative definitions for risk will be useful only when the discourse
community (author and readers, speaker and audience) already
possesses a shared conception of risk. For example, when people already
agree that risk is a relationship between probability and future events, it
2

John Rawls, The Theory of Justice 5-6 (1971).
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becomes useful to stipulate definitions that specify the relationship as a
curve, a set of curves mapped over probability distributions, or as a
simple product. Many definitions can be found in the risk analysis
literature, and, again, different definitions do not imply important
philosophical differences.
It is not clear whether our claim of competing conceptions of risk is
itself disputable. Most literature on risk either proposes or presupposes a
general conception of risk, then proceeds immediately to offer
definition and qualification of the favored conception without
acknowledging the existence of alternatives. This practice might reflect
a belief that risk is an uncontested concept, but it is typical for papers
on justice or truth-unarguably contested concepts-to follow a similar
pattern. Debates over conceptions of justice or truth have a long
philosophical history, however, while debates over risk do not. Frank
Knight, in 1921, reviewed the economic debate over the meaning of
risk, concluding that investments where the probability of success is
known do not count. 3 A substantially different view was introduced
into economic literature by Friedman and Savage, who argued that any
choice of options with multiple outcomes, each of which can be
assigned a conditional probability contingent upon selecting a given
4
option, is made under conditions of risk.
The basic elements of this approach had been present in von
Neumann and Morgenstern's influential Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior, although this book makes few uses of the word
"risk" and does not introduce it as a technical term. 5 Luce and Raiffa
3 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), at 46, takes up the subject in
an attempt to analyze profit and makes the following reductio argument:
If risk were exclusively of the nature of a known chance or mathematical
probability, there could be no reward of risk-taking; the fact of risk
could exert no considerable influence on the distribution of income in
any way. For if the actuarial chance of gain or loss in any transaction is
ascertainable, either by calculation a priori or by the application of
statistical methods to past experience, the burden oF bearing the risk can
be avoided by payment of a small fixed cost limited to the
administrative expense of providing insurance.
Risk-taking justifies profit for him precisely because ordinary business decision
making is based upon inherently incomplete forms of knowledge quite unlike those in
which statistics can be used to make an accurate assessment of probability; id. at 197.
4 Milton Friedman & Leonard J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices
Involving Risk, 56 J. Political Econ. 279 (1948).
5 John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior (1944).
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further clarified the Friedman and Savage approach, and many
economists adopted the practice of treating risk not as a quantity but as
a class of decisions. 6 It is worth noting that a strict application of the
Luce and Raiffa terminology does not lend itself to risk comparisons.
Decisions are either risky or not under their definition; but practice has
not been so strict- a good example of how multiple definitions thrive
under a common conception of risk.
The history of debate in the philosophy of economics has not been
widely recognized in more recent discussions of technological risk.
Recognition that disputants hold different conceptions of risk is
implicit in papers by Granger Morgan 7 and in a book by Mary
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. 8 Recent literature on risk, risk
assessment and risk communication reflects a growing acknowledgment
that there are multiple conceptions of risk, 9 but the literature often
obscures the distinction between psychological patterns in risk
perception and truly competing philosophical conceptions of risk.
Kristin Shrader-Frechette offered a systematic classification for
competing conceptions of risk in a 1991 book. 10 Her approach forms a
starting point for understanding the potential for philosophical debate.
Shrader-Frechette's Risk and Rationality
Shrader-Frechette describes two positions in the philosophical
debate over risk. On one side, positivists think that risk is a purely
scientific concept admitting complete characterization and analysis
through data collection and quantitative methods. Opposed are
6
R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and
Critical Survey 13 (1957).
7
M. Granger Morgan, Probing the Question of Technology-Induced Risk, 18
IEEE Spectrum 58 (1981).
8 Mary Douglas & Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (1982).

9

See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987); S. Rayner,

Risk and Relativism in Science for Policy, in The Social and Cultural Construction of
Risk 5 (Brandon B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello, eds. 1987); Sheila Jasanoff,
Bridging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis, 13 RiskAnal. 123 (1993); Abraham H.
Wandersman & William K. Hallman, Are People Acting Irrationally? 48 Am.

Psychologist 681 (1993); James Flynn, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Gender, Race,
and Perception of Environmental Health Risks, 14 Risk Anal 1101 (1994); and

Camille Lomoges, Alberto Cambriosio & Louis Davignon, Plurality of Worlds,
Plurality of Risks, 15 RiskAnal. 699 (1995).

10 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality (1991).
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relativists who think that risk is a purely subjective reaction to
phenomena encountered in personal or social experience. Two
conceptions of risk emerge. The positivist interprets risk as referring
objectively to the circumstances of the physical world. The relativist
takes risk to a purely mental construct expressing emotional, moral or
political reactions. Shrader-Frechette uses Chancey Starr's work on risk
to exemplify the positivist, and Douglas and Wildavsky's to exemplify
11
the relativist, conceptions.
In fact, the positivist/relativist divide misses much of what is truly
contested among various disputants she places in either camp. The
article upon which Starr built his reputation in risk studies drew upon
differences between voluntary and involuntary risks to account for
differential rates of acceptance of new technologies. Starr's treatment of
risk implies that perception of voluntariness is a subjective reaction. The
differential in acceptability of voluntary and involuntary risks reveals
social preferences about risky technologies. It is clear that Starr favors
scientific studies for assessing the level of risk over popular opinion, yet
it does not seem fair to classify his conception of risk as "admitting
complete characterization and analysis through data collection and
quantitative methods." Values have a role for Starr. Neither do there
appear to be good reasons to classify Douglas and Wildavsky as
relativists in Shrader-Frechette's sense. Risk and Culture is a terse and
often obscure book. Throughout her other work, Douglas argues that
the specific content of beliefs about purity, danger and social taboos is
arbitrary. Beliefs, e.g., about what is and what is not food vary from
culture to culture, and any specific culture's belief is arbitrary. These
beliefs are distributed in any culture so as to establish an invariant
structure of social relationships. 12 Risk and Culture compared the
arbitrary content of belief systems of several cultures to make the point
13
that risk beliefs are part of political culture.
11 Id. at 29-46.
12 Mary Douglas, Environments at Risk, in Implicit Meanings 230 (1975).
13 The theory of political culture is a crucial component of Douglas and Wildavskys
view, but further discussion of cultural theory lies beyond the scope of the present
paper. See Michael Thompson, R. Ellis & Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory 216-7

(1990).
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According to Douglas and Wildavsky, the central role of beliefs
about purity and danger is to constitute a system of signs that structure
social relationships. This means that there is little point in arguing the
scientifically assessed probabilities with the Hima of Africa, who believe
that it is risky for women to come in contact with cattle. This belief in
Hima culture does not identify an objective threat but organizes Hima
society. Douglas and Wildavsky assert that individuals and groups
within any society will establish relationships which form a fixed
structure that establishes the hierarchy of power within the society, and
that an individual's statements or beliefs about risk are indicative of
their place within that society. 14 Douglas and Wildavksky's view
entails that statements about risk are as much (and often more) a
reflection of deep social structure as they represent the world. This view
does not deny facts about risks in general, and it most certainly does
not entail relativism with respect to specific well-characterized elements
of risk, such as the statistical probability of events.
Shrader-Frechette introduces the positivist/relativist dichotomy to
establish the basis for her own view of risk. Shrader-Frechette is surely
correct to place Starr's conception of risk in contrast with the
conception in Risk and Culture. It is fair to say that her view moderates
between the positivist and relativist conceptions, as she describes them.
Yet, close reading of Starr and Douglas fail to support a claim that they
advocate these two philosophies. In the next section, we offer an
alternative schema for characterizing contrasting conceptions of risk,
and argue that it more accurately reflects the contested nature of risk.
The Probabilist/Contextualist Dichotomy
Prior to 1980, decision theorists had developed variations on the
Friedman and Savage interpretation that defined risk as a function of
the probability and utility (or value) of events. The decision theoretic
treatment of risk held that the utility or value of a choice to a decision
maker was a function of the relative value of potential outcomes. The
decison maker's desire for each potential outcome must be discounted
by its probability to calculate utility, producing an expected value for
each choice that could then be compared and ranked with the expected
value of other options. The decision theoretic notion had been widely
14 Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 8, at 40-48.
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accepted as an analysis of rational risk taking behavior for investment
and gambling choices, and continues to be accepted as a standard of
rationality by many today. 15 Granger Morgan has noted that attitudes
toward risky technology were influenced by dimensions other than
probability and harm (or consequence). 16 The list of dimensions that
influence attitudes toward risky technology included voluntariness
(whether those exposed to risk were coerced), catastrophic nature
(whether harms were cumulative of many isolated events, or associated
with a single event), reversibility (whether unwanted consequences
could be repaired or the original situation could be restored) and many
others. Yet, Morgan was unclear in stating how these dimensions relate
to risk as such. At least two ways to understand this relationship lie at
the heart of philosophical disagreements over risk.
In 1993, Hornig offered a dichotomous schema that is in many
ways similar to Shrader-Frechette's. She characterized scientific views of
risk in a manner largely consistent with Shrader-Frechette's positivism,
but in place of relativism Hornig offered a contextualist (or
constructivist) view. 17 On this view, the social context in which issues
or decisions arise determine which dimensions of risk are most
important. Hornig does not propose, as one of Shrader-Frechette's
relativists might, that lay assessments of risk are just as accurate as
expert assessments, but she does assert that lay assessments can be more
sophisticated than scientific assessments. While expert assessment is
quite likely to be more accurate in measuring dimensions of risk
deemed important by the scientific community, experts may fail to
recognize other dimensions (e.g., voluntariness) that may be more
relevant to the points of decision in a given context. We will follow
Shrader-Frechette and Hornig in proposing a dichotomy, but rather
than suggesting two conceptions of risk in diametrical opposition, we
15 See Ronald N. Giere, Knowledge, Values and Technological Decisions: A
Decision Theoretic Approach, in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk
Management 183 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander, eds. 1991).
16 Morgan, supra note 7.
17 Susanna Hornig, Reading Risk: Public Response to Print Media Accounts of
Technological Risk, 2 Pub. Understanding Sci. 95.(1993); Paul Thompson offers
arguments for contextualism in Risk: Ethical Issues and Values, in Agricultural
Biotechnology, Food Safety and Nutritional Quality for the Consumer 204 (June
Fessendon MacDonald, ed. 1991) but does not use that term.
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suggest that our dichotomous terms represent opposite ends of a
continuum. Each represents an extreme and logically incompatible
view. Few if anyone truly holds the extreme views, but several different
conceptions can be mapped out in between.
At one extreme lies a purely probabilist conception. This sees risk as
essentially characterized by the probability of events or their
consequences. The characteristics found on Morgan's list are secondary
or accidental dimensions of risk, just as coloration might be thought of
as a secondary or accidental dimension of the organ for sight.
Accidental dimensions might be extremely influential in the formation
of attitudes toward risk, just as blue, green or brown are influential in
forming attitudes toward eyes. Further, it may be that all risks possess
some accidental dimensions, just as all eyes are colored. Nevertheless,
accidental dimensions do not serve as criteria for determining whether
something is or is not a risk, just as coloration is irrelevant to whether
something is or is not an eye. One understands risk if and only if one
understands probabilities. Probability is the essential or primary
dimension of risk, other dimensions are inessential and accidental.
At the opposite extreme is the contextualist conception, that places
probability at parity with voluntariness, familiarity and all the rest. The
contextualist believes that risk will always be characterized by some
subset of attributes on the list, but that no single attribute will be
understood to characterize every instance or risk. On the contextualist
view, the concept of risk is more like the concept of a game than the
concept of an eye. Games have time limits, rules of play, opponents and
criteria for wining or losing, but none of these attributes is essential to
18
the concept of a game, nor is any of them characteristic of all games.
Similarly, a contextualist view of risk takes it that risks are characterized
by some combination of attributes such as voluntariness, probability,
intentionality, and so on, but that no one of these attributes is essential.
As described above, probabilist and contextualist conceptions of risk
are both extreme views, unlikely to be held by anyone. Strictly
speaking, the probabilist takes probability to be the only essential
characteristic of risk, but even those closest to the probabilist pole
usually presume that risk is also characterized by some element of
negative or unwanted consequence. The movement toward the
18 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 34 (1953).
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probabilist pole is most often recognizable when those inclined toward
the view speak informally. It is typical to hear probabilists refer to risk
in ways that permit direct substitution of the word probability without
substantial transformation of meaning. When a probabilist speaks of the
risk of an earthquake, for example, the term "risk" functions as a
synonym for probability. Nevertheless, the harm and damage
associated with an earthquake is implicit; few would apply the concept
of risk so as to anticipate the risk of positive or satisfactory events. The
important implication of the probabilist view is that estimation of
probabilities is the sine qua non of risk.
The contextualist, on the other hand, claims that no single attribute
is a necessary condition for the existence of risk. In this the
contextualist appears committed to the view that some instances of risk
involve no elements of probability or chance. It is, again, important to
recall that the pole positions of the probabilist/contextualist dichotomy
represent limit cases. We do not claim that working conceptions of risk
reach the limit case where probability, uncertainty, and indeterminism
are entirely absent. The more important implication of the contextualist
view is that there will be some cases in which estimation and
clarification of probabilities are largely irrelevant to understanding risk,
as well as to assessment, acceptability and even mitigation of risk.
In summary, the probablist/contextualist dichotomy yields a
schema for charting conceptions of risk. It does not yield important
conceptions of risk at either extreme, but relative emphasis upon
probabilistic characteristics shapes distinct understandings of risk that
can be plotted between the poles. Extreme probabilism and extreme
contextualism will be unusual, but a review of the literature on risk
reveals both strong probabilists and strong contextualists, each close to,
yet not quite reaching the extreme. There are also relatively weak
versions of both positions. An advocate of any given conception will be
able to advance sophisticated arguments in its favor, but the balance of
this paper does not offer such an argument. Instead, we identify some
representative points along the spectrum, then analyze some broad
implications of each view. The representative viewpoints are not
intended as exhaustive. Any thorough review of conceptions of risk
would need to take up the so-called "social construction" or
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constructivist school of risk scholarship. Douglas and Wildavsky's book
was arguably one of the first efforts in this school, but many others have
followed. In the most general terms, social constructivists are interested
in the way that individuals and groups make claims about risk, and in
the ultimate affect that this activity has on the way that risk issues are
19
understood, not only by individuals but also by the public at large.
Clearly, many constructivists themselves make claims that appear to
have important philosophical content. Some imply a nominalist view of
language, others appear to deny any that risk claims have any reference
beyond the minds of people who make them. If constructivists are
serious about the apparent philosophical implications of their claims,
then there are important points of philosophical difference that are not
captured by the probabilist/contextualist continuum. It is quite possible
that some constructivists are adopting the relativist view ShraderFrechette describes. We are convinced, however, that the majority of
risk constructivists have simply not thought about the epistemological
and ontological implications of their claims. We think that many
constructivists overstate their position in an attempt either to stress the
importance of social context in selecting and framing which risk issues
to address, or to stress how factors we identify in the contextualist view
may be more important than probability or consequence. We think that
they might choose words more carefully if they were aware of the fits
that they cause. Our contextualism is, thus, not equivalent to social
constuctivism, though we would expect to find many social
constructivists adopting contextualist conceptions of risk. Any attempt
to further categorize and interpret the claims of constructivists is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
Probabilist Conceptions of Risk
The strong probabilist position is exemplified by the classic risk
analysis paper "Risks of Risk Decisions" by Chauncey Starr and Chris
Whipple. For Starr and Whipple the fundamental core of any risk
assessment is a quantitative analysis. Risk in the broadest sense is to be
determined by a scientific analysis of potential harm per segment of the
population. Starr and Whipple define analysis as "a process based on
19 Joel Best, Images of Social Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social Problems
(1989).
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collected data, anecdotal cases, and statistics, any of which may or may
not be correct; and, based on these, we invent simplified models to
predict an outcome." 20 By "predict an outcome," it is clear that Starr
and Whipple mean "assign a probability to an outcome." Starr and
Whipple are neither unsophisticated nor dismissive in their analysis of
the different social factors that come into play whenever risk is an issue.
They pay close attention to non-analytical evaluations of risk, which
they refer to as intuitive. Starr and Whipple give little credence to
intuitive analysis as a legitimate form of knowledge; however, they do
acknowledge that it possesses a great deal of influence in the political
arena. In fact Starr and Whipple contend that, "For specific types of
risk, in which intuitive evaluations of risk and benefit contradict
analytical evaluations, the necessary consensus may not develop, but
rather a conflict requiring political resolution is likely to result. ' 2 1 In
such situations, Starr and Whipple encourage making quantified forms
of estimated probability the key point of discussion in the debate. They
argue that estimated frequency risk analysis data should assuage the
public's fears if it is used to directly address the issues.
The strong probabilist conception exemplified by Starr and
Whipple takes the probability of events as essential to any knowledge
claim about risk. Although Starr and Whipple are quite interested in the
sources of political controversy over risk, they permit only two sources
of disagreement: different beliefs about the value of outcomes and
about probabilities. 22 As such, those who base attitudes or reactions to
risk upon dimensions such as familiarity, reversibility, voluntariness and
the like form intuitive assessments of risk, but what this means to Starr
and Whipple is that qualitative elements either substitute for knowledge
of probability or reflect relative judgments of the value of consequences.
Energy technology, especially nuclear power, was the point of reference
for Starr and Whipple's discussion. They evidently believed that
different estimates of the probability of a nuclear accident explain the
deviation between expert and lay risk assessments. Hence they advocate
20 Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, 298 Science 1115
(1980).
21 Id. at 1119.
22 Id. at 1116.
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a program of education to correct widespread misperceptions of
probability.
Shrader-Frechette appears to be a weak probabilist. She refers to
herself as a scientific proceduralist. The scientific proceduralist
recognizes that risk evaluation is not solely a matter of scientific
investigation: "but also a political procedure to be negotiated among
experts and the public." 23 She claims that scientific proceduralism lies
somewhere between the radical positions of naive-positivism and
relativism. She claims that the proceduralist uses objective data in the
practice of risk analysis. Like Starr and Whipple, she assumes that the
objective component of risk analysis lies in the assignment of
probabilities to potential events. However, the risk proceduralist also
allows that risk evaluation is affected by politics and presupposes the
adoption of scientific values or postulates. Assessment of probabilities is
itself a value-laden procedure for Shrader-Frechette. Decisions about
the reference population, the treatment of uncertainty and statistical
procedures will affect the assessment of probability. She believes that it
is impossible to make such decisions apart from value judgments.
Hence there must be an opportunity for multiple assessments, each
informed by the values of contending groups in political culture.
Shrader-Frechette's view exemplifies probabilism because any
discussion of risk will be characterized by facts about probability. She
believes that the centrality of facts about probability militates against
any view of risk that does not employ technical assessment of
probabilities. However, other dimensions can be equally important not
only for the acceptability and communication of risk, but for key
decisions the empirical assessment of risk itself. For example, the
relative frequency of cancer or other diseases may vary for different
groups. The poor may be especially vulnerable due to more frequent
occupational or residential exposure to hazardous substances. Risk
analysts who define the reference population in light of such specific
vulnerabilities may well arrive at different assessments of probability.
This results shows that values associated with dread, with powerlessness,
or with involuntary risks can permeate the technical assessment process;
it does not, however, represent a non-probabilist conception of risk.
Probabilities are still considered to be the essential core or risk.
23

Shrader-Frechette, supra note 10, at 56.
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Contextualist Conceptions of Risk
A strong contextualist will hold the position that the relevance of
any given dimension for risk is fixed by the context in which a risk issue
arises and is debated. Put another way, people who raise questions and
warnings about the risk of practices or technologies may use risk
language to make entirely different sorts of claims, all legitimate
applications of the concept of risk. Saying that something is risky may
be a way of saying, e.g., that it is unfamiliar or untraditional, and this
claim may not be intended to imply that there are any known or
suspected hazards associated with the risky practice, much less that
hazards can be estimated as a probability of harm. 2 4 While the
probabilist will find such forms of speech as anomalous or inappropriate
for understanding risk issues, the contextualist will interpret them as
entirely legitimate and meaningful. They point toward different issues
than uses of the work "risk" that imply the quantification and ranking
of hazards, but both uses of the word are legitimate, and both deserve
respect and accommodation in risk management.
It is plausible to read Douglas and Wildavsky as strong
contextualists, but the cultural theory interwoven into their position
complicates analysis. A clearer example of the strong contextualist
approach can be found in Alonzo Plough and Sheldon Krimsky's paper,
"The Emergence of Risk Communication Studies: Social and Political
Context." They frame it as a discussion of risk communication, but
their analysis implies a contextualist conception of risk. They show that
when lay persons talk about technological risk they make selective
reference to some attributes described by Morgan, often excluding
others. For example, the attribute of control comes to the fore in much
talk about risk. So that people raise concerns about risk as ways of
expressing anxiety about loss of control, irrespective of the association
between control and harm. For Plough and Krimsky, even scientists
and manufacturers can be deeply interested in talking about risk to
demonstrate confidence and control. 25 This need not imply that lay
24 See Paul B. Thompson, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Rhetoric of Risk:
Some Conceptual Issues, 9 Env'l Prof. 316 (1987) and Biotechnology, Risk, and
Political Values: Philosophical Rhetoric and the Structure of Political Debate, in
Biotechnology- Assessing Social Impacts and Policy Implications 3 (D. J. Webber, ed.
1990).
25 Alonzo Plough & Sheldon Krimsky, The Emergence of Risk Communication
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persons equate risk with control in every communicative context. Lay
persons will presumably shift to emphasize probability or harm, e.g., in
the context of discussing insurance or gambles. Plough and Krimsky
show that no dimensions or risk are essential to every instance of talking
about risk, but any dimension might be relevant, depending on context.
Plough and Krimsky claim that risk must be studied within the
social context in which risk debates or discussion arise. They distinguish
the "symbolic" meaning of risk from the meaning attributed to it by
26
the technical risk assessment community.
[To] understand the symbolic meaning of risk
communication, we have to study risk in its social context...
the symbolic definition of risk communication differs
substantially from the conventional view. While the former
includes cultural and experiential inputs, the latter generally
is reductionistic, focusing on quantifiable variables.
They are troubled by the reductionistic tendencies of traditional risk
communication. They are contextualist in the sense that they claim that
to make effective policy decisions and to communicate effectively
about risks, it is helpful to take into account a risk's technical or
scientific, and cultural contexts.
One key difference between strong and weak contextualists is the
vehemence with which probabilist conceptions of risk are criticized.
Weak constructivists' reluctance to promulgate clearly non-probabilist
interpretations of risk is another. Carl Cranor is a weak contextualist in
both respects. He investigates the differences between the scientific
communities that determine what risk is for regulatory purposes and
the legal system which responds to tort cases with evidence garnered
27
from the scientific community. Cranor is concerned that:
[The] way burdens of proof and other procedures are
used in science to establish a theory or causal relationship
tend to be much more demanding than those adopted in
legal institutions. This leads to a conflict between scientific
and legal institutional evidentiary norms. If we uncritically
adopt scientific standards for legal purposes, we risk
frustrating or begging the legal issues.
Studies: Social and Political Context, 12 Sci. Tech. & Human Values 4 (1991).
26 Id. at 5.
27 Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the
Law 5 (1993).
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Legal sufficiency is defined for the tort law as consisting of "a
preponderance of the evidence." 2 8 The side with the better evidence
should win the case. This is different from the attempt to establish
statistical significance. The point of the tort law is to establish liability,
to link a harm to an accused. It is a great deal more difficult to meet
the burden of proof in the scientific arena. Cranor cites the 95 percent
29
rule as evidence:
[At] a minimum scientists want to be at least 95 percent
sure that they are not falsely adding to the stock of scientific
knowledge when they report new discoveries or new
statistical results.
Cranor explores the different conceptions of risk held by these two
communities. The scientific community's conception of risk results in
the quantification of probabilities. Cranor seems to believe that the legal
community is also probabilist, but members of the legal community
make claims based on a preponderance of the evidence. A
preponderance of the evidence implies sufficient probability to make
reasonable claims about harm. The legal community and the scientific
community both define risk in terms of verifiable observations. The
difference between the two conceptions lies in the evidentiary standards
that the two groups have adopted and the legal community's
substitution of conditional probability for causality.
Cranor is contextualist in that he understands the philosophical
tension between the probabilist conceptions of his two communities in
contextualist terms. His project was to show how two different
conceptions of risk grow out of the needs of distinct communities.
These conceptions make sense within these communities; however,
miscommunication may result when the two communities interact with
each other. Such is the case whenever the American judicial system
must rule on cases involving toxic chemicals. The way to address this
tension is through recognizing the context dependent elements of each
community's conception of risk, rather than trying to establish one
conception as right, and the other as wrong. Cranor has provided a
contextualist analysis of two different probabilist 6onceptions of risk.
However, Cranor does not offer an alternative conception' of his own.
28
29

Id.
Id. at 55
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He is also entirely respectful of the need to establish probabilistic
conceptions. He omits the question of whether any clearly nonprobabilist conceptions are worthy of such respect. As such, while
Cranor has offered contextual criteria for deciding which characteristics
of any given conception of risk should be used, his rejection of the
probabilist position in this book is of the mildest form possible.
Implications for Risk Assessment and Evaluation
This paper amends the literature represented by Bradbury and
Shrader-Frechette in two ways. First, differentiating the concept of risk
from risk conceptions and definitions provides a more carefully
nuanced account of contentious issues at the philosophical, political and
technical levels. Second, the probabilist/contextualist dichotomy
reformulates some familiar elements in risk debates, and it is worth
considering some of these implications. In summary, as one moves
from probabilist to contextualist poles, risk assessment is seen as
increasingly value laden. As such, the implications of each conception
for risk evaluation can be summarized in terms of the extent to which
one sees these as truly distinct processes. The strong probabilist thinks
that risk assessment is a process of fact finding, while risk evaluation is a
process of deciding how to use those facts. The strong contextualist, on
the other hand, sees evaluative judgments permeating every stage of risk
assessment, and understands risk evaluation largely as the attempt to
acknowledge and justify these judgments explicitly and publicly.
The immediate practical relevance is that risk analysts should be
aware of the contentious nature of debates over risk, but should not
expect them to be resolved by offering more subtle definitions. The
strong probabilist is likely to regard risk assessment as primarily a
process of researching and assigning probabilities. The strong probabilist
will regard specific events or outcomes to be analyzed, e.g., mortality,
economic loss or events such as the release of radioactive material as
given. Identification of unwanted outcomes might be thought relatively
unproblematic, perhaps because the specific events or outcomes to be
avoided are establish as a component of public policy (a safe minimum
standard, for example) or through administrative decisions (economic
cost benefit tradeoffs).
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In either case, the events of interest are given, rather than being
established as part of the risk assessment process itself. Events are given
in a dual sense. They function as assumptions, established values, or
"facts" that frame an analysis. They are also literally given to the analyst
by some external source, such as a government or corporate hierarchy.
The probabilist view is therefore most plausible to individuals who work
in organizations or in settings where their job is to assess probabilities
for events or outcomes that have been judged to be important by
others. This includes many scientific risk analysts whose orientation to
risk is a response to requests for information about mortality and
morbidity associated with exposure to specific or suspected toxins.
Many of the value decisions will have been made prior to such requests,
and most especially the decision that information on probabilities is
needed. Strong probabilists see these decisions as extrinsic to risk
assessment proper; they come to see their work as the whole of risk
assessment, rather than only a part.
Because assessment of probabilities is largely technical, the strong
probabilist comes to resemble Shrader-Frechette's positivist, who thinks
that risk is an entirely objective matter, unaffected by values. One of
the key value decisions is which of many potential outcomes or events
to assess. In the strong probabilist conception, these decisions are seen as
outside of the assessment process; they are made prior to assessment.
Once the events of interest have been identified, however, even a strong
contextualist may conceive of risk assessment as a fact finding process,
one in which the facts to be found relate to probabilities. All the value
judgments have been made for the probability assessor, and hence
appear not to be relevant to the strong probabilist conception of risk.
A weak probabilist like Shrader-Frechette herself will recognize the
values implicit in the selection of events or outcomes that are
quantified. The value dimension of selecting outcomes is especially
evident in recent work on environmental justice. 3 0 Here it has been
shown that the decision of which risk to assess may or may not include
distributive elements, such as a higher level of exposure to minorities, to
30 Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality
(2d ed. 1994); see also Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, Hidden Hazards
in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management 17-20 (Deborah G.
Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander, eds. 1991) for a discussion of environmental justice
concerns and the risk selection process in risk assessment.
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women or to children. The weak probabilist will also recognize value
decisions in the practice of failing to include social consequences such as
plant closings or economic dislocation from risk assessment. 3 1 A weak
probabilist may also recognize that the derivation of probability itself
may have value dimensions. Probabilities derived from uncertainty and
expert opinion, for example, may be treated quite differently from
those derived from robust statistical samples. In contrast, the strong
probabilist is likely to regard each of these simply as alternative sources
of data, and will regard the combination of data or measurements from
such diverse sources as a quantification problem that will be solved as an
element of probability theory itself. The weak probabilist may prefer
quantification procedures that do not combine subjective and objective
probabilities and that do not represent uncertainty as probability, to
facilitate the application of distinctions that will be made in the process
32
of risk evaluation
Both the strong and weak probabilist conceptions of risk presume
that risk is determined by probability and consequence. As such,
matters such as whether a risk occurs as the result of a person's
intentional action, or whether persons bearing risk have assumed it
voluntarily are extrinsic questions, questions that will be answered after
a risk assessment is complete. Yet is just such questions that may need
to be answered first in certain legal contexts, for it is clear that a risk has
been voluntarily assumed, there may be no need for an assessment of
probabilities at all. Similarly, if a risk has been imposed under coercive
conditions, the probability of harm may be largely irrelevant. A weak
probabilist thus will recognize certain contexts in which the key factual
questions have little to do with probability, or where alternative factual
burdens of proof must be met before assessment of probability and
outcome becomes relevant. A contextualist, however, will presume that
firm-level management, tort law, and environmental action regulation,
each represent contexts in which the concept of risk will figure
prominently in decision making. On a contextualist view, the empirical
scientific research needed to satisfy the requirements for empirical
assessment may differ dramatically from one context to another, and
31 Roger Kasperson & Jeanne Kasperson, id.at 20-23.
32 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Probabilistic Uncertainty and Technological Risks
in Science, Politics and Morality 43 (Ren6 von Schomberg, ed. 1993).
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the contextualist believes that identifying those research needs is itself
part of the risk assessment process. The events of interest are not given,
and assessment must include a process for systematically determining
which events (if any) to assess in probabilistically.
Strong and weak contextualists differ on this point primarily in
their attitude toward probabilists. A weak contextualist such as Cranor
uses contextualism primarily as a way of explaining why experts differ
over which probabilities to assess. Strong conextualists such as Krimsky
and Plough suggest that advocating or presuming a probabilist view
forecloses important questions in the risk assessment process in a
manner that is morally and politically objectionable. The strong
contextualist position thus politicizes conceptions of risk. A probabilist,
on this view, is not simply adopting a set of epistemological or
conceptual criteria for understanding risk. They are inevitably engaged
in a political struggle to ensure that their preferred criteria are utilized
in policy decision making. The potential for an acrimony between
probabilists and strong contextualists is evident here, but engaging this
debate at a philosophical rather than personal level might improve
everyone's ability to understand what is at stake in establishing priorities
for risk assessment.
Implications for Risk Communication
It is quite likely that probabilists and contextualists will have rather
divergent perspectives on risk communication. Probabilists are likely to
think that people generally do not know about probabilities, and that
they need to know probabilities to have adequate information about
risk. Given this starting point, risk communication is largely a process of
disseminating information about probability. Contextualists are less
likely to approach risk communication with any specific assumptions
about what people need to know. For the contextualist, risk
communication will be construed as bridge building between discourse
communities-between groups who share a particular social context and
have evolved patterns for conceptualizing and discussing risk within that
context. The divergence between probabilist and contextualist
approaches to risk communication is an example of a more general
pattern in science communication studied by John Zimon.
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Zimon describes three models for science communication. The
deficiency model takes the general problem of science communication
to be one of public ignorance, "which must by all means be
overcome." 33 This view issues out of the assumption that the great
majority of ordinary people have very little understanding of science,
and is typified by science communication efforts that stress knowledge
of facts and theories. Zimon faults the deficiency model for presuming
that scientific knowledge tends to be misrepresented and
misunderstood outside the boundaries of the scientific community. He
states, "Scientists themselves do not have a clear and consistent notion
of what 'science' covers, and often disagree profoundly on what it is
34
telling us about the world."
The second model is the rational choice model. It "focuses on those
points where a particular piece of knowledge might be expected to play
an important part in people's lives - that is when they have to make
35
practical decisions to which this knowledge might seem relevant."
Here, the goal of science communication is to supply the missing piece
of knowledge. Zimon notes the close association between the deficiency
and the rational choice models, but the problem of the rational choice
model resides in the way it construes "need to know" situations.
Certainly there are some circumstances in which a key piece of
information (some facts about probabilities, for instance) are relevant,
but many problems of everyday life are better characterized as
problems of information management. Knowing where to go for
information, and whom to trust is often more important than knowing
key facts. It is this kind of information that comes to the fore in what
Zimon calls the context model. This model recognizes that a person's
desire for information is shaped by their circumstances, that the
credibility of a source depends heavily on its perceived interest in a
particular context, and that scientific information will be combined
36
with broader values in forming any individual's personal beliefs.
33 John Zimon, Not Knowing, Needing to Know, and Wanting to Know, in When
Science Meets the Public 14 (Bruce V. Lewenstein, ed. 1992).
34 Id. at 16.
35 Id
36 Id. at 18-19.
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Following Zimon's rational choice model, the probabilist is likely to
see risk communication as the dissemination of information about
probability and consequence. Facts about probability and consequence
will be presumed to be what the ordinary person "needs to know," to
make better decisions. Following the deficiency model, the probabilist
may also see risk communication as involving the promotion of a
conceptual framework for making use of probability and consequence
information in personal choice and public policy. When the two are
combined, the probabilist sees risk communication as publicizing facts
about probability and consequence, as correcting false perceptions, as
dissociating accidental dimensions from people's understanding of risk,
and as encouraging a choice procedure that interprets every choice as
involving risk. The probabilist approach to risk communication, in other
words, includes a broad philosophic commitment to a particular view of
decision making and rational choice.
The contextualist does not assume that the word "risk" means just
one thing. Contextualists presume that people acting from different
social or problem solving contexts have distinct notions of risk and
demands for both factual knowledge and evaluative judgment about
risky situations. Risk communication is, on Zimon's context model, a
process of attempting to establish dialog between individuals and
groups with very different conceptions of risk. Because of these
differences, risk assessment is a process fraught with opportunity for
confusion, distrust and even deceit. A successful risk communicator is
one who succeeds at negotiating meanings and mediating diverse
discourse communities who have some need to interact.
For example, one group requesting information about risk may
presume that risks are intentional actions, to be distinguished from
familiar hazards and freak occurrences. If they request information
from another group that does not recognize a distinction between risk
and either familiar hazards or freak occurrences, seeing all of them as
characterized in terms of the probability of an unwanted event, the
communication may easily misfire. The information seekers may feel
misled by the information providers, and they may interpret this as
evidence that someone is trying to harm them. The information
providers may interpret this response as emotional, at best, and perhaps
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as evidence that the information seekers are irrational. Any and all of
the responses would be expected by the contextualist; any and all are
reasonable given the divergent conceptions of risk. The probabilist risk
communicator, however, is unlikely to have much sympathy with the
information seekers in this example. What they appear to want, after
all, has little to do with the probability of unwanted outcomes. The
probabilist goal for risk communication would be to help them see the
facts about probabilities and outcomes. The seekers will be more
rational when they adjust their behavior in accordance with the relative
probability of those unwanted outcomes, irrespective of whether they
are also associated with accidental dimensions of human agency.
Hornig makes the case for the context model in risk
communication by suggesting that scientists have a less sophisticated
understanding of risk than the lay public. 37 It is true that probabilist
conceptions of risk tend to presume Zimon's deficiency and rational
choice models and that these models represent a somewhat
unsophisticated understanding of communication. Yet, it is unclear that
scientists, as a group, are committed to the probabilist conception of
risk, nor is it obvious that probabilist conceptions of risk are less
sophisticated than contextualist conceptions.
Conclusion
Bradbury, Shrader-Frechette and Hornig offer dichotomous
schemes for classifying opposing views but overstate and misidentify
the points of contention. The debate between probabilists and
contextualists is a debate over how to understand risk, and both are
appealing to a common concept of risk in constructing their respective
positions. It is not a debate in which positivist and relativist
epistemologies are pitted against one another, nor is it a debate between
well defined interest groups, each utilizing a rhetoric of risk to advance
a political position. While these other debates do influence the way that
particular risk issues are negotiated, they do not carve the field of risk
studies into opposing philosophical and methodological positions.
Risk probabilism and risk contextualism represent the opposite ends
of a continuum for conceptualizing risk. Scientists and scholars who
study risk and risk issues will likely adopt conceptions of risk that fall
37

Hornig, supra note 17.
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somewhere along the axis between extreme probabilism and extreme
contextualism. Their relative positions will fix many of their
methodological assumptions for risk analysis and risk communication,
and will probably reflect other philosophic commitments, such as their
broader view of how science should play a role in public policy or in the
personal decision making of ordinary people. Clearly, the continuum
between probabilism and contextualism does not map every
contentious issue in risk studies. Even probabilists who share the same
general conception of risk can find much to dispute when choosing the
particular quantitative representation of that conception, and such
controversies pale in comparison to those in which large commercial
38
interests are affected by key choices in risk assessment methodology.
Yet the probabilist/contextualist continuum is one key dimension of
controversy in risk issues, and one that should be recognized as such by
everyone with an interest in understanding the implications of their
opponent's positions, as well as their own.

38 See John D. Graham, Laura C. Green & Marc J. Roberts, In Search of Safety:
Chemicals and Cancer Risk (1988) for a study of how different assessment
methodologies were debated on scientific grounds, but with thinly veiled links to
commercial and political interests. This book indicates how politics and money can
make risk issues extremely contentious. Yet it seems likely that virtually everyone
involved in the issues discussed (as well as Graham, Green and Roberts themselves)
accepted a strong probabilist conception of risk. No doubt these scientific and
political debates seem much more important to those who already share a given
conception of risk, and perhaps that explains why engaging the philosophical debate
between distinct conceptions of risk has been so difficult.

